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Batchelder: Book Review

BOOK REVIEW
PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE: By Thomas S. Szasz, M.D. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1965. Pp. 283.
In an era in which extensive judicial emphasis has been
placed on "due process of law" in criminal proceedings, both in
the federal courts and in the state courts, Dr. Szasz's book serves
as a jarring reminder that in at least one vital area of the concept of due process, much remains to be done. The emerging
definition of due process has enunciated the rights guaranteed
the individual by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments 1 ; and viewed within that framework, this book,
although published in 1965, remains particularly timely, for
Szasz, speaking as a psychiatrist, 2 endeavors to demonstrate how
the criminal procedure in virtually every jurisdiction in the
United States operates to use psychiatry as a weapon against the
individual. This injustice is accomplished through the application of two procedures: the involuntary pretrial psychiatric
examination of the accused to determine his fitness to stand trial
and the coerced plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" induced
when the accused is found fit to stand trial. Either of these procedures, the author maintains, effectively denies the accused his
Sixth Amendment right to trial.
Viewing the traditional American trial system as a kind of
game, Szasz demonstrates how the laws allowing involuntary
pretrial psychiatric examination place the prosecutor, traditionally the adversary of the accused, in the advantageous position
of being able to win the game merely by having his opponent declared incompetent to play. The typical statute allows the prosecutor, if he merely suspects that the accused may suffer from
some mental aberration, to cause that accused to undergo a psychiatric examination against his will. This may entail up to sixty
days' confinement in a mental institution, all without benefit of
1 See, for example, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 387 U.S. 1 (1964); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).

Dr. Szasz is a professor of psychiatry, a member of the American Pyschoanalytic Association, a fellow of the American Psychiatric Association, and
consultant to the Committee on Mental Hygiene of the New York State Bar
Association.
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trial, and may result in the accused's being found incompetent to
stand trial, in which case he will be committed indefinitely to a
mental institution, either civil or criminal, still without trial. In
this situation the commitment serves as a final disposition of the
charges against him. 3 The relationship between the courtappointed psychiatrist who conducts the examination and the
accused is not a privileged doctor-patient relationship, and this
fact further strengthens the hand of the prosecution. The cooperative defendant finds that his statements to the psychiatrist
are used against him; the defendant who invokes his right to be
silent finds that he is classified as unresponsive, negativistic, and
incompetent.
The case studies and competency hearing transcripts included
in the course of the book serve to emphasize the Kafkaesque
quality which the trial game assumes because the weapon of
psychiatry has been given to the prosecution. In the case of one
Luis Perroni, for example, the psychiatrists found Perroni to be
"negativistic," a term they defined as meaning "a reaction opposed to a normal reaction expected [by the psychiatrists] in a
given situation," 4 because he refused on the advice of his attorney to answer some of the questions concerning his crime. The
psychiatrist was unable to remember the specific questions or
even the types of questions which Perroni had refused to answer.
Szasz contends that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the
right to trial is not a guarantee contingent upon the accused's
proving that he is mentally stable, any more than it is contingent
upon his proof that he is physically sound. It is an unconditional
or absolute guarantee, which is being denied to the defendant
who is forced to submit to a psychiatric examination which then
determines if he will be allowed to stand trial at all.
Recognizing that there are indeed persons who are incompetent to stand trial, Szasz suggests that the proper standard by
which a person accused of crime should be judged is not whether
his mental health is generally sound, but whether he is capable
of understanding the charges against him and of contributing to
his defense. Those persons most qualified to judge this capability
are members of the legal profession, since they are versed in the
See chapter 2, pp. 37-55, in which Szasz examines the statutes for three
jurisdictions: New York State, the District of Columbia, and the federal
courts.
4 See p. 122.
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elements of a criminal defense. If an accused is found incompetent to stand trial, he should be dealt with in much the same
manner as one physically unable to stand trial-his trial should
be postponed until he is able to be tried.
The author's scheme for judging competence to stand trial
and dealing with those persons adjudged incompetent appears to
be a practical approach, eliminating the need for, and the dangers incident to, the psychiatric examination. Moreover, it strictly observes the right of an individual to stand trial and to be free
from coerced mental examination and treatment by the state.
ALICE M. BATCHELDER
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